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The Teenage Brain: Public Perceptions of Neurocognitive
Development during Adolescence
Sibel Altikulaç1, Nikki C. Lee1, Chiel van der Veen1, Ilona Benneker1,2,
Lydia Krabbendam1, and Nienke van Atteveldt1
Abstract
■ Over the past decade, important insights have been obtained
into the neurocognitive development during adolescence. To
better understand how these neuroscientific insights impact
the real world, we investigated how neuroscience has shaped
public perceptions of the “teenage brain” and if these percep-
tions influence adolescent behavior. When asking to generate
free associations with the word “teenage brain,” adolescents
(n = 363, Mage = 14.47 years) and parents (n = 164, Mage =
47.16 years) more often mention undesirable behaviors (e.g.,
“irresponsible”) than desirable behaviors (e.g., “creative”).
Despite these dominantly negative associations, priming ado-
lescents with positively versus negatively framed statements
about adolescent brain development did not influence their
subsequent risk-taking, impulsivity, and performance on
response-to-failure tasks. However, we did find a more nuanced
effect, related to how much adolescents agreed with the nega-
tive versus positive priming statements: Adolescents’ negative
beliefs about adolescent brain development reinforced negative
behaviors by increased risk-taking behaviors, and adolescents’
positive beliefs reinforced positive behaviors by using positive
strategies to cope with academic setbacks. The current findings
underline the impact of views that build up over time and that
these are not easily influenced by a one-time instance of infor-
mation but rather reinforce the impact of new information. To
prevent negative perceptions of the teenage brain from becom-
ing self-fulfilling prophecies, it is important that communication
about adolescent neurocognitive development is framed in a
more balanced way. Neuroscientists need to be more aware
of how their research impacts the real world, before we are fully
ready for “real-world neuroscience.” ■
INTRODUCTION
Research in the field of cognitive neuroscience has yielded
a tremendous amount of insight into the workings of the
human brain, including how it develops throughout child-
hood and adolescence. Recently, attention has shifted to
questions about how this information is applicable to
our understanding of real-world phenomena such as learn-
ing at school, interacting with others, or maladaptive be-
haviors. This line of exploration is of high importance,
because the impact of neuroscientific information
entering the public sphere is high (O’Connor, Rees, &
Joffe, 2012). O’Connor and Joffe (2013) have gone so
far as to suggest that the societal impact of neuro-
science is ultimately expressed by the meaning that
lay people attach to neuroscientific information in their
daily life. However, exploring the real-world relevance
of neuroscientific insights is also challenging, as the lab-
oratory environment, jargon, and the many technical
steps involved in neuroimaging experiments are ex-
tremely difficult to translate and bring closer to a real-
life context (van Atteveldt, van Aalderen-Smeets, Jacobi,
& Ruigrok, 2014; Schleim & Roiser, 2009). As a conse-
quence, the risk of misconceptions is ever present
(Dekker, Lee, Howard-Jones, & Jolles, 2012; Illes
et al., 2010). Thus, to address the question whether
or not we are ready for “real-world neuroscience,” we
also need to consider how neuroscience impacts the
real world (O’Connor et al., 2012). In this study, we
aim to contribute to this important challenge by explor-
ing the effects of disseminated insights from the field of
developmental neuroscience and, specifically, the in-
creased understanding of brain development during
adolescence. We examine how this knowledge influences
the real world, such as lay people’s beliefs about the
“teenage brain” and the way in which it impacts adoles-
cents’ behaviors.
Over the years, adolescence has often been viewed as a
period of storm and stress (Hines & Paulson, 2006), char-
acterized by behaviors such as conflicts with parents and
increases in risk-taking. The application of neuroimaging re-
search has begun to elucidate how changes in the brain may
contribute to these behaviors (e.g., Casey, Tottenham,
Liston, & Durston, 2005). One fundamental insight is that
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adolescence is a unique developmental stage, which is
characterized by the continued refinement of neural or-
ganization, especially in pFC (Mills, Goddings, Clasen,
Giedd, & Blakemore, 2014; Crone & Dahl, 2012).
However, because adolescence is conceptualized as a dis-
tinctive and influential phase in development, it is vulner-
able to so-called “neuro-realism”—the use of neuroscience
research to objectify and define phenomena (Racine,
Waldman, Rosenberg, & Illes, 2010). Combined with the
finding that scientific research is more credible when
accompanied by (irrelevant) neuroscience findings
(Weisberg, Keil, Goodstein, Rawson, &Gray, 2008), it seems
that information deriving from developmental neuro-
science may confer legitimacy on views of adolescent
development. For example, the pattern of protracted
neurocognitive development has become mainstream
knowledge among parents and teachers (Choudhury,
McKinney, & Merten, 2012), which has led to the teenage
brain being increasingly used as an explanation for
adolescent behaviors (van de Werff, 2017).
As is often the case when translating neuroscientific
results to the real world (van Atteveldt et al., 2014), not
all nuances have been preserved in this discussion.
Consequently, the concept of the teenage brain is often
appropriated to warn parents, teachers, and other care-
givers about the potential dangers of typical adolescent
behaviors, which have been linked to a lack of cognitive
control and subsequent increased levels of risk-taking
(van de Werff, 2017). In contrast to the negative framing
that seems to abound in the public domain, the current
direction in developmental neuroscience is to view ado-
lescence as a period of opportunities and possibilities.
Recent evidence suggests that, although adolescence is
indeed a period of high levels of risk-taking, this also en-
ables increased exploratory behaviors, with usually posi-
tive consequences for learning and social interactions
(Crone & Dahl, 2012). Thus, the negative narrative that
appears to dominate public discourse is an incomplete
reflection of current theories.
Framing of knowledge about adolescent brain devel-
opment is important, as it may impact adolescents’ self-
concept and behavior (Choudhury et al., 2012). Previous
research in other domains has shown that individuals’ be-
haviors can be manipulated simply by modifying others’
expectations of their behaviors, even when these expec-
tations are independent of previously observed behaviors
(Snyder & Stukas, 1999). These expectations are thought
to result in perceptual biases toward the expected be-
havior as well as self-fulfilling prophecies (Buchanan &
Hughes, 2009). Some initial work, based on self-report
measures, has been done examining these effects in ad-
olescent samples. These suggest that, when parents hold
generalized negative beliefs about adolescents, these be-
liefs are a stronger determinant of the behavior they ex-
pect from their adolescent than the adolescent’s actual
behavior ( Jacobs, Chhin, & Shaver, 2005). Other work
has shown that both adolescents and parents’ expecta-
tions of negative adolescent behaviors (e.g., risk-taking)
are predictive of the subsequent incidence of these be-
haviors (Buchanan & Hughes, 2009). More recently, Qu,
Pomerantz, Wang, Cheung, and Cimpian (2016) demon-
strated that many American teenagers view adolescence
as a period characterized by a decreased responsibility to
parents and family, in contrast to an increased importance
of peer relationships. Adolescents also reported reduced
engagement in school compared with younger children.
These lower expectations of familial responsibility and
school engagement predicted decreases in independent
learning over the course of a school year. These studies
suggest that certain behaviors that are considered norma-
tive in adolescence may shape both expectations and ac-
tual behaviors (Qu et al., 2016).
In light of the danger of neuro-realism as described
above, the impact of stereotypical views about adolescent
behavior and development may be especially negative if
aspects such as brain immaturity, lack of impulse control,
and increased risk-taking are continuously emphasized
when referring to the teenage brain. However, adoles-
cents and parents’ current perspectives on the teenage
brain, and the influence of positively or negatively
framed scientific information on actual adolescent be-
haviors instead of its influence on self-reported behav-
iors, have not been studied. By defining adolescence
as a period when the brain is too immature to enable
performance of certain tasks (e.g., planning school-
work) or particular behaviors (e.g., refraining from dan-
gerous activities), the “immature teenage brain” may be
viewed as the cause of this suboptimal behavior. This
could reinforce the amount of undesired behaviors in
adolescents, or at least provide a legitimate excuse for
showing it, rather than encouraging improvement of
the cognitive function or behavior in question. In con-
trast, a greater influence of positive framing, for ex-
ample, by focusing on greater flexibility and learning
possibilities, may lead to a more positive impact on pub-
lic discourse and on the behavior and self-conceptions
of adolescents.
In this study, we aim to study the effect of neuro-
science information about adolescent brain development
on public perceptions of the teenage brain and experi-
mentally measured adolescent behaviors. First, we exam-
ined Dutch adolescents and parents’ perspectives on the
teenage brain.1 To this end, we first addressed the ques-
tion whether adolescents and parents of adolescents’
perspectives of the teenage brain are predominantly pos-
itive or negative. More specifically, we investigated (a)
which spontaneous associations adolescents and parents
have with the word “teenage brain,” (b) which associa-
tions adolescents think adults have with “teenage brain,”
and (c) which associations parents think their adolescent
child has with this popularized term. On the basis of pre-
vious studies showing that the lay message about the
teenage brain often focuses on the negative aspects of
adolescence (Choudhury et al., 2012), we hypothesized
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that both adolescents and parents would list negative
associations more frequently than positive associations.
Furthermore, because of the origin of the Dutch trans-
lation of the word “teenage brain,” we hypothesized that
both (stereotypical) adolescent behaviors as well as
brain-specific associations would be mentioned.
Second, we examined how activation of positive or
negative views of adolescence influenced subsequent be-
havior. Adolescents were presented with either positively
or negatively framed scientific statements about the in-
fluence of neurocognitive development on adolescent
behavior. Previous work has shown that exposure to self-
relevant information, such as responding to statements,
can activate views about stereotypes and can influence
subsequent behavior (e.g., Bry, Follenfant, & Meyer,
2008; Moè & Pazzaglia, 2006). In the example study of
Bry et al. (2008), participants were asked to complete a
questionnaire that focused on either independent or in-
terdependent views of the self. This is in line with previ-
ous work that has shown that behaviors can be changed
by increasing accessibility to specific knowledge through
priming (see, e.g., Wheeler & Petty, 2001). Following
these previous studies that used exposure to self-relevant
information to prime stereotypical beliefs, we used
negatively and positively framed statements to activate
either positive or negative beliefs about the developing
adolescent brain. After indicating their agreement with
the statements, the participants performed a number of
tasks aimed to assess typical behaviors in adolescence: a
risk-taking task, an impulsivity task, and a response-to-
failure task. We first analyzed task performance using
the priming as a categorical (between-subject) indepen-
dent variable and hypothesized that the negatively (vs.
positively) framed information about the adolescent
brain would increase risk-taking and impulsivity and de-
crease resilience to academic challenges and setbacks.
Second, to get a more nuanced picture of how prior be-
liefs about the adolescent brain relate to the performed
tasks, we correlated the Likert scores on the statements
with task performance separately for each of the prim-
ing groups. As previous studies indicate that there might
be gender differences in adolescents’ risk-taking behav-
iors (Felton, Gibson, & Sanbonmatsu, 2003) and cogni-
tive impulsiveness (Frederick, 2005), suggesting that
boys show more risk-taking behaviors and less cognitive
impulsivity compared with girls, we included sex as a co-
variate in our analyses. No sex differences were found in
responses to academic failure (Blackwell, Trzesniewski, &
Dweck, 2007), and therefore sex was not included as a
covariate.
The results of our study might increase insights into
how neuroscientific knowledge influences adolescents’
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Age, Sex, and Educational Level for Parents (n = 164) and Adolescents (n = 363)
Parents Adolescents
Male (n = 32) Female (n = 131) Unknown (n = 1) Male (n = 171) Female (n = 192)
Age (in years)
Mean (SD) 48.5 (5.1) 46.9 (4.0) 45.0 14.5 (1.0) 14.4 (0.9)
Range 38–59 35–58 − 11.9–16.7 12.2–16.8
Unknown 6.3% 1.5% − 7.0% 1.6%
Highest completed educational level
Primary school − 1.5% − − −
High school 6.3% 6.9% 100.0% − −
MBO 9.4% 19.8% − − −
HBO 34.4% 45.1% − − −
WO 50.0% 26.7% − − −
Number of children in the family
Mean (SD) 2.7 (1.0) 2.3 (0.8) 2.0 (−) − −
Age range of children 4–23 years 2–28 years 10–13 years − −
The Dutch schooling system after high school is divided into MBO (middelbaar beroepsonderwijs), which is focused on vocational training, and two
types of higher education—HBO (hoger beroepsonderwijs, i.e., university of applied science) and WO (wetenschappelijk onderwijs, i.e., university).
HBO education focuses on vocational training in subjects such as nursing and teaching, whereas WO education offers higher level programs at
research universities, such as medicine and law.
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real-world beliefs and behaviors and thereby highlight
the importance of incorporating real-world perspectives




Three hundred sixty-five adolescents from four schools
in the north of the Netherlands and 193 parents or
caregivers of other adolescents between 11 and 18 years
old (secondary education) participated in this study.
If a participant completed the full questionnaire but
had missing responses for a particular measure, the
participant was excluded in the analyses for that partic-
ular measure and was included in the other analyses.
Data of two adolescents were removed because they
did not finish the questionnaire. Furthermore, 29 par-
ents did not provide their associations with the teenage
brain and were therefore excluded from our data set.
The analyses were conducted with 363 adolescents
Table 2. Descriptions and Examples of the Codes That Were Used in Analyzing Adolescents and Parents’ Associations with the
Teenage Brain and the Percentages of the Mentioned Associations
Code Description Example(s) A (%) AP (%) P (%) PA (%)
Behavior Associations that refer to specific
behaviors during adolescence
and/or specific activities that
are undertaken by adolescents
28.87 53.11 55.94 51.99
Desirable behavior Behavior that is considered




3.12 3.54 5.12 5.62
Boundary searching
behavior
Behavior indicating that the








4.23 8.58 10.45 14.05
Undesirable behavior Behavior that is considered to
be undesirable or disturbing in




15.9 37.66 35.86 27.63
Neutral behavior Behavior that cannot be






5.53 2.25 3.07 0.94
Behavior of parents Specific behavior of parents
to cope with their teenage
children or how adolescents
perceive their parents’ behavior
“It’s a challenge,” “difficult
parent,” “rules that
make no sense”
0.10 1.07 1.43 3.75
Development Associations that refer to the
development of the teenage
brain and/or developments




11.67 9.12 19.26 9.60
Synonyms Associations having the same or
nearly the same meaning as the
teenage brain or associations
that use (parts of ) the concept
of the teenage brain
“Brain,” “adolescent,”
“adolescent brain”
28.97 12.12 3.28 3.28
Miscellaneous “Meetings,” “book,”
“presentation”
30.48 25.64 21.52 35.13
A = associations adolescents have; AP = associations adolescents think parents have; P = associations parents have; PA = associations parents think
adolescents have.
342 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 31, Number 3
(52.9% female) and 164 parents (79.9% female; see
Table 1).
Measures
Associations with the teenage brain. In the first part of
the questionnaire, we asked adolescents to name the first
three spontaneous associations that came to mind when
thinking about the teenage brain. Adolescents needed to
provide three typed answers in different boxes. Further-
more, we asked the adolescents to fill in the first three
associations when thinking about what adults, like their
parents and teachers, might think about the teenage brain.
In addition, we asked participating parents/caregivers to
name their first three associations with the teenage brain
and what they thought that their teenage children might
associate with the teenage brain (see Table 2 for an over-
view). All in all, we distinguished four groups of associa-
tions: (1) associations adolescents have with the word
“teenage brain” (A), (2) associations adolescents think
adults have with teenage brain (AP), (3) associations par-
ents have with the word “teenage brain” (P), and (4)
associations parents think their adolescent has with the
teenage brain (PA).
Priming statements. We examined whether priming by
neuroscientific statements influenced adolescents’ be-
haviors by comparing the task results of adolescents in
three different priming conditions: (1) positively framed
statements (positive condition), (2) negatively framed
statements (negative condition), and (3) no statements
before the tasks (neutral condition). Every statement cov-
ered the same topic in both conditions but was either
negatively or more positively framed. We included a
broad variety of adolescent stereotypes in the set of state-
ments, such as being emotionally driven, struggling with
planning, and reduced behavioral control, resulting in
nine statements covering the most common stereotypes
(see Table 3). Because negative adolescent stereotypes
are more common, the negatively framed statements
were used as a starting point, and we then reformulated
the statements with less emphasis on negative aspects to
create positive versions covering the same core concepts.
The participants had to indicate whether they agreed or
disagreed with the statements on a 5-point Likert scale
Table 3. Scientific Statements about School and Social Behaviors during Adolescence, Framed Positively, Negatively, or Both
Positive Framing Condition Negative Framing Condition
1. Due to hormonal changes, adolescents often experience
intense emotions that influence their behavior.
1. Due to hormonal changes, adolescents often have intense
emotions, which they find difficult to properly control.
2. Adolescents are good at planning and thinking
flexibly because their brain is still developing.
2. Because their brains are still in development, many adolescents
struggle to plan their activities.
3. Adolescents are better than adults at adjusting their
behavior within a group because they are more sensitive
to social influences.
3. Adolescents are worse than adults at adjusting their
behavior within a group because they are more sensitive
to social influences.
4. Adolescents often seek new and exciting
experiences due to the continued development
of the emotional regions in the brain.
4. Adolescents often display irresponsible and risky behaviors
because their emotional brain areas are still developing.
5. Adolescents are good at ignoring irrelevant information
and are therefore less quickly distracted than adults.
5. Adolescents are not very good at ignoring irrelevant
information and are therefore more easily distracted
than adults.
6. Because adolescents are increasingly able to
control their behavior, they are more frequently
able to make well-thought-out choices.
6. Because adolescents have less control over their behavior than
adults, they often make impulsive choices.
7. During adolescence, connections in the brain become
increasingly efficient, facilitating more complex thought
processes.
7. During adolescence, connections and networks in the
brain are not yet efficient, which makes complex thought
processes difficult.
8. Adolescents’ brains are more flexible than those
of adults. As a result, adolescents are more able
to learn from their mistakes and adjust their
behavior.
8. Adolescents’ brains are less flexible than those of adults. As a
result, they are less able to learn from their mistakes and adjust
their behavior.
9. Your ability to learn can change. As an adolescent,
you can influence this by doing your best.
9. Adolescents’ ability to learn is fixed. You have little
influence on this, no matter how hard you try.
Numbers represent the order in which the adolescents received the statements. Adolescents in the neutral condition received the statements rep-
resented in bold in the same order.
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(1 = totally disagree, 5 = totally agree). Participants in
the positive and negative conditions completed the state-
ments before the tasks; participants in the neutral condi-
tion, after the tasks (see Procedure).
Balloon analogue risk task. The Balloon Analogue Risk
Task (BART; Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 2003)
provides a measure of risk-taking behavior in which par-
ticipants had to inflate a balloon. The further the balloon
was inflated, the more points the participant received.
However, if the balloon burst, no points were earned for
that trial. The participant could choose how far to inflate
the balloon by selecting the number of desired pumps on
a slider (minimum [min] = 0, maximum [max] = 128).
Then, the participant was shown whether or not the bal-
loon had burst and whether or not he or she had earned
points for that round (see Figure 1). This process was
repeated 30 times.
The absolute scores of the BART were used in sub-
sequent analyses, meaning that the number of pumps
that an adolescent chose on the slider was used, without
taking the explosion of the balloon into account. Previous
work has shown this to be a more accurate estimation of
adolescents’ risk-taking behaviors (Pleskac, Wallsten,
Wang, & Lejuez, 2008).
Cognitive reflection test. The Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT; Frederick, 2005) questionnaire measures impulsivity
to cognitive responses using three relatively easy mathe-
matical questions. However, to answer correctly, an in-
dividual needs to suppress the erroneous answer that
immediately comes to mind and think again to provide
the correct answer. The items that were used were slightly
adapted to better match to the participants’ age, but the
content was similar to the original items (see Table 4).
Participants’ score on the CRT was determined by the
number of correct answers, ranging from 0 to 3. After-
ward, participants were categorized into three groups:
low (0 point), intermediate (1–2 points), or high (3 points)
CRT group (following Frederick, 2005).
Response-to-failure task. This questionnaire (Blackwell
et al., 2007) provides a measure of response to failure
based on a scenario followed by nine questions. The sce-
nario that was used was as follows: “Imagine: You start a
new class in mathematics at the beginning of the year and
you really like the subject and the teacher. You think you
know the subject pretty well, so you study a medium (not
much, but also not little) amount for the first quiz.
Afterwards, you think you did okay, even though there
were some questions you didn’t know the answer to.
Figure 1. Display of the sequence of the risk-taking task (BART). Adolescents had to inflate a balloon (30 times) by selecting the number of
desired pumps on a slider (min = 0, max = 128) and could earn more points when the balloon was further inflated, but no points were earned if the
balloon burst. On the basis of the selected number of desired pumps, it was shown whether or not the adolescent had earned points and the
balloon had burst.
344 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 31, Number 3
Then the class gets their quizzes back and you find out
your score: you only got a 4. What would you think and
what would your initial reaction be?” Please note that, in
Dutch, tests are marked on a scale from 1 to 10, so a “4”
means a failed test. Participants indicated whether they
agreed with each statement presented after the scenario
on a 6-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 6 =
strongly agree). The questionnaire consists of two sub-
scales: Helpless Attributions (HA; four items, e.g., “I
wasn’t smart enough”) and Positive Strategies (PS; this
subscale is a combination of the items of Positive Effort
(PE)-based strategies [two items, e.g., “I would work
harder on math from now on”] and the recoded items
of Negative Effort (NE)-avoidant strategies [three items,
e.g., “I would spend less time on math from now on”],
and a mean score is calculated).
We started with these a priori subscales; however,
because we used a Dutch translation and the subscales
showedmediocre internal consistency (HA: ω= .56, greatest
lower bound [GLB] = .57, Cronbach’s α = .55; PS: ω = .64,
GLB = .74, Cronbach’s α = .63), we used principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) with varimax rotation to further in-
form us about the best structure of the items and subscales
(see Table 5). The scree plot of the PCA showed that using
three factors was optimal. The PE items and one NE item
loaded on the first component: PE1, PE2, and NE2. We
therefore used these three items for the revised subscale
PS (with NE2 recoded). The second factor included three
of the HA items (HA1, HA2, and HA4) and one NE item
(NE1). Therefore, we included HA1, HA2, NE1, and HA4
in the second factor creating the revised subscale HA.
The third factor included NE3 and HA3 and seems to mea-
sure thoughts and feelings specific to the (hypothetical)
math examination. However, this subscale was not used
in further analyses because of low internal consistency.
Procedure
The parents or caregivers of the adolescent participants
received an information letter about the study and had to
indicate if they did not wish for their child to participate
(passive consent). If the adolescent could participate in
our study, he or she received information about the study
and gave informed consent before testing. Participants
were tested in groups in a quiet room in their school.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three
priming conditions (i.e., positive, negative, or neutral) by
a number. Boys and girls were equally distributed among
conditions. Participants received a link to the question-
naire and completed the questionnaire by themselves.
The questionnaire started with the free associations (same
for all conditions). Next, participants assigned to the
positive or negative priming condition indicated their
agreement on nine statements and subsequently per-
formed behavioral tasks: BART, CRT, and response-to-
failure task. Participants assigned to the neutral condition
answered the statements (alternately positively and nega-
tively framed statements; see Table 3) after finishing the
Table 4. Differences of CRT Items
Original Items Adapted Items
1. A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs
$1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball
cost? _____ cents
1. A ball and a whistle cost A1.10 in total. The ball costs
A1.00 more than the whistle. How much does the whistle
cost? _____ cents
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets,
how long would it take 100 machines to make
100 widgets? _____ minutes
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 cakes, how long
would it take 100 machines to make 100 cakes? _____ minutes
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the
patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch
to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the
patch to cover half of the lake? _____ days
3. There are flowers growing in a field. Every day, the number of
flowers doubles. If it takes 48 days for the flowers to cover the
entire field, how long would it take for the flowers to cover half
of the field? _____ days.
Table 5. Factor Loadings, Item Numbers, and Cronbach’s
Alphas of the Subscales Used for Response to Failure Based on
PCA with Varimax Rotation
Factor Loading
Item
Number Cronbach’s α ω GLB













Items NE3 and HA3 were excluded for the further analyses, because the
internal consistency was low, Cronbach’s α = .47. Item NE2 was re-
coded for further analyses. Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin = .70. Bartlett’s test
of sphericity, χ2 (36) = 560.43, p < .001. GLB = greatest lower bound.
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tasks to ensure that the total measurement length was
equal for all groups (as they were in the same room).
Participants read a debriefing letter after they com-
pleted the questionnaire and were thanked for their
participation.
Participating parents received a digital information let-
ter in their mailbox and could provide their consent ac-
tively online through an Internet link. The questionnaire
followed directly after the informed consent. This ques-
tionnaire started with the free associations, which is the
only part that was included in this study. All procedures
were approved by the ethics committee of the Faculty of
Behavioural and Movement Sciences, Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam.
Analyses
Associations with the teenage brain. All associations
were inserted and coded in ATLAS.ti Version 7.5.18
(1993–2017). Because “teenage brain” is often used to
warn parents, teachers, and other caregivers about the
potential dangers of typical adolescent behaviors (van
de Werff, 2017), coding of associations was mainly fo-
cused on behavioral associations. On the basis of every-
day conceptions of how lay people talk about the teenage
brain (i.e., immature, lacking cognitive abilities, refine-
ment of the brain), and after a first exploration of our
data set, we developed a coding scheme (see Table 2).
Codes were not used or seen by the participants them-
selves; they were only used to label participants’ associa-
tions post hoc. Five different categories of behavioral
associations were used to code the associations in our
data set: (1) desirable behavior: behavior that is considered
to be desirable in social situations, for example, “respon-
sible”; (2) boundary searching behavior (or trying new
things): behavior indicating that the adolescent is trying
out new things (without showing boundary crossing or
disturbing behavior), for example, “discover the world”;
(3) undesirable behavior: behavior that is considered to
be undesirable or disturbing in social situations or behav-
ior that might impair others, for example, “selfish”; (4)
neutral behavior: behavior that cannot be categorized
as either desirable, boundary searching, or undesirable
behavior and/or behavior that is unspecified, for exam-
ple, “behavior”; and (5) adult behavior: specific behavior
of parents to cope with their teenage children or how ad-
olescents perceive their parents’ behavior, for example,
“be strict.” In coding our data, we used the following
set of criteria to determine whether or not a respon-
dent’s association would qualify as an association that
was related to behavior: (a) The association describes
an activity of an individual that is observable by others,
for example, “mood swings”; (b) the association refers
to a behavioral action, for example, “(to) party”; or (c)
the association refers to consumption of products, for ex-
ample, “alcohol.” Next to associations related to specific
behaviors during adolescence, we also coded our data for
associations related to the development of the teenage
brain or changes that take place during adolescence
and associations that were merely synonyms of the teen-
age brain (see Table 2).
All data were coded by the first author. To establish the
interrater reliability of our coding scheme, 20% of the
data were randomly selected to be independently scored
by a second rater. With a Cohen’s κ of .87, the interrater
reliability was found to be almost perfect (McHugh, 2012;
Landis & Koch, 1977).
Differences in adolescents and parents’ perspectives of
the teenage brain were analyzed in two steps. First, we
calculated percentages of adolescents and parents’ asso-
ciations with the teenage brain for the different catego-
ries of our coding scheme (see Table 2) to get an
overview of the associations in each group (i.e., A, AP,
P, and PA). Next, we analyzed differences in the associa-
tions between groups using chi-square tests. In line with
our research question and guided by the codes we as-
signed to our data, we analyzed differences in associa-
tions between groups that were related to different
types of behavior and development.
Priming statements and tasks. The analyses were con-
ducted as follows: First, differences in mean scores on
the statements between the group who indicated agree-
ment with positive statements and the group who indi-
cated agreement with negative statements were examined.
Using an independent t test, we compared the mean score
of agreement toward positively framed statements with
the mean score of agreement toward negatively framed
statements.
Second, we analyzed whether receiving positively or
negatively framed information about adolescent brain de-
velopment influenced overall task performance by using
the priming condition as a categorical variable (positive,
negative, or no information). On the basis of previous lit-
erature, we included sex as a covariate when examin-
ing risk-taking behaviors (Felton et al., 2003) and
impulsivity behaviors (Frederick, 2005). We conducted
an ANCOVA for the BART, a chi-square test for the CRT
and a MANOVA for the response-to-failure task.
Third, to get a more nuanced picture of the relation
between participants’ beliefs about adolescent brain de-
velopment and their task performance, we examined
whether the level of agreement with the statements
(mean agreement score) was related to participants’ per-
formance on the three tasks. These analyses were con-
ducted separately for participants who had to indicate
their agreement with positive statements and for partici-
pants who had to indicate their agreement with negative
statements. Because participants in the neutral condition
received the statements after the tasks, they were ex-
cluded from these analyses. We used multiple linear regres-
sion models to analyze the influence of agreement with
the statements on the BART and on the response-to-
failure task and a multinomial logistic regression for the
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CRT. All analyses were corrected for multiple comparisons
(false discovery rate [FDR]; Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995).
In the first and third analyses described above, we used
Likert scale scores on the priming statements. According
to some researchers (e.g., Jamieson, 2004), nonparamet-
ric tests would be better suited to analyze Likert scale
scores, because they provide ordinal data. However,
parametric tests are more robust than nonparametric
tests (Sullivan & Artino, 2013) and can be used with




To ensure the specificity of the found associations to ad-
olescent brain development (rather than to adolescent
behavior more generally), an extra questionnaire was ac-
quired post hoc in a new sample of 252 adolescents. The
aim of this supplemental study was to examine whether
the findings of our original study were specific to (1) ad-
olescent brain development rather than adolescence in
general (Part 1) and (2) adolescence as a specific devel-
opmental period compared with childhood (Part 3).
Furthermore, this study was also used to (3) validate
the positive versus negative valence of the priming state-
ments that were used in the original study (Part 2).
Participants
Two hundred fifty-two Dutch adolescents from four schools
in the Netherlands were recruited as a new sample for our
supplemental study (47.6% female; Mage = 13.8 years,
SDage = 1.10 years, Unknownage = 13.1%). If a participant
completed the full questionnaire but had invalid data for
a particular measure, the participant was excluded in the
analyses for that particular measure but was included in
the other analyses.
Procedure
Participants of the new sample were randomly assigned
to one of two versions of the questionnaire. Boys and
girls were equally distributed among conditions. The
questionnaire was divided into three parts, in which
Parts 1 and 3 were the same in both versions. In the first
part, the participants had to indicate to what extent they
thought that the listed adolescent behaviors are a conse-
quence of the developing brain. Next, in the second part,
the participants scored nine statements, randomly taken
from the positively or negatively framed priming condi-
tions in the original study, and indicated whether they
thought that the statement was a positive or negative de-
scription of adolescent behavior. In the third part, partic-
ipants indicated whether the different types of behavior,
as mentioned in the positively and negatively framed
statements in the second part, were more common dur-
ing childhood or adolescence or was equally common
during childhood and adolescence.
Measures
Questionnaire. We used two versions of the question-
naire, in which only Part 2 differs between versions.
The framing of the statements was intermixed; four or
five statements were positively framed, and the other
four or five statements were negatively framed (see also
Table 6). The two versions of the new questionnaire were
randomly distributed among the 252 participants (n =
128 in Version 1, n = 124 in Version 2). In Parts 1 and
2 of the questionnaire, adolescents had to indicate on a
5-point Likert scale to what degree their opinion corre-
sponds to the statement (Part 1) or how positive/negative
they thought the statements were (Part 2). In Part 3, ado-
lescents had to choose the statement (of three options)
they agreed with most (see Table 6 for an overview of
the questionnaires used).
Part 1. To maximize the connection to the original data,
we used one reported association from each of the cat-
egories “undesirable” (rebellious or disobedient behav-
ior), “boundary searching” (stubborn), and “desirable”
(eager to learn). In total, nine participants had incom-
plete data for these three questions and were there-
fore excluded from the analyses (N = 243 adolescents;
female = 47.3%; Mage = 13.8 years, SDage = 1.10 years,
Unknownage = 12.8%).
Part 2. The statements were randomly taken from the
positively or negatively framed priming conditions in
the original study. Of the 252 adolescents, 10 adolescents
did not complete this second part of the questionnaire,
resulting in 242 adolescents (female = 47.5%; Mage =
13.8 years, SDage = 1.10 years, Unknownage = 13.2%).
Part 3. Of the 252 adolescents who participated in this
study, 29 adolescents did not complete this item, resulting
in 223 participants (female = 48.4%; Mage = 13.8 years,
SDage = 1.09 years, Unknownage = 12.6%).
RESULTS
Main Study
Perspectives on the Teenage Brain
Adolescents reported 994 associations with the teenage
brain (A) and 932 associations with what they thought
adults (such as their parents and teachers) would think
about the teenage brain (AP). Parents reported 488 asso-
ciations with the teenage brain (P) and 427 associations
with what they thought their teenage children would
think about the teenage brain (PA). Percentages of
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responses per coding category are shown in Table 2 and
Figure 2.
To examine differences between adolescents and par-
ents’ associations with the teenage brain, we conducted
several chi-square tests. Although there were similarities
in adolescents and parents’ associations, we found some
interesting differences as well. First, analyses showed that
parents reported significantly more undesirable behav-
iors when thinking about the teenage brain compared
with adolescents (P vs. A), χ2(1) = 74.89, p < .001.
Besides, adolescents also thought their parents would
associate the teenage brain with undesirable behaviors
more frequently than they did themselves (AP vs. A),
χ2(1) = 117.20, p < .001. Moreover, in our data set,
the teenage brain was mostly associated with behavior
that is undesirable (802 associations vs. 113 desirable
behavior associations). Next to the low total number of
associations related to desirable behavior, adolescents
and parents did not differ in the number of reported as-
sociations related to this behavior (A vs. P), χ2(1) = 3.62,
p = .06. When comparing adolescents and parents’ asso-
ciations that were related to boundary-searching or risk-
taking behavior, results indicated that parents associated
the teenage brain more frequently with this type of be-
havior than adolescents (P vs. A), χ2(1) = 21.57, p <
.001. Interestingly, adolescents hardly associated the
teenage brain with parenting behavior (one association),
whereas parents reported 14 associations related to par-
ents’ behavior (P vs. A), χ2(1) = 28.88, p < .001. Finally,
parents more frequently associated the teenage brain
with adolescent development than adolescents (P vs.
A), χ2(1) = 15.51, p < .001. However, there was no
difference in the frequency of associations coded as “de-
velopment” when comparing what adolescents thought
their parents would associate and what parents thought
their teenage children would associate with the teenage
brain (PA vs. AP), χ2(1) = 0.08, p = .78.
Furthermore, we examined adolescents’ perspectives on
the teenage brain using their agreement with positively and
negatively framed statements. Differences in mean scores
(1.0 = totally disagree to 5.0 = totally agree) between the
group who received positively framed statements (n =
120) compared with the group who received negatively
framed statements (n= 121) were examined with an inde-
pendent t test. On average, participants who received neg-
atively framed statements agreed less with the statements
(M = 2.73, SE = 0.06) compared with participants who re-
ceived positively framed statements (M= 3.20, SE= 0.05).
This difference,−.47, BCa 95% CI [−0.62,−0.33], was sig-
nificant, t(239) = −6.54, p < .001, with a medium effect
size, d = .77.
Effect of Priming on Risk-taking Behavior
First, before we examined the effect of priming on risk-
taking behavior during the BART, we excluded eight partic-
ipants (50% female, Mage = 15.3 years, SDage = 0.9 years)
who had more than one missing trial. Therefore, 355 par-
ticipants (53% female,Mage = 14.5 years, SDage = 1.0 years)
were included for the analyses on risk-taking behavior
(see Table 7 for the descriptive statistics).
An ANCOVA of Priming Condition (positive, negative,
and neutral) × BART mean score with Sex as a covariate
was conducted to examine whether receiving priming
Figure 2. Percentages of adolescents and parents’ associations with the teenage brain. Undesirable behavior is mostly mentioned by both adolescents
and parents. A = adolescents’ association with the word “teenage brain”; AP = adolescents’ thoughts of adults’ association with the teenage brain;
P = parents or caregivers’ association with the word “teenage brain”; PA = parents or caregivers’ thought of the association of their child with the
teenage brain.
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by neuroscientific information influenced overall task
performance. This resulted in a main effect of Sex, F(2,
351) = 1.89, p = .02, η2 = .02, but no main effect of
Priming condition, F(2, 351) = 1.98, p = .15, observed
power = .39.
Finally, to examine whether participants’ agreement
toward the positively or negatively framed statements
influenced risk-taking behavior during the task, a linear
regression analysis (with mean agreement score and
sex) was conducted per priming condition. For the neg-
ative statements, the regression model with mean agree-
ment score had the best model fit, and therefore only the
results of the first model will be reported. A significant
effect of agreement score on risk-taking behavior was
found in participants who indicated their agreement with
the negative statements, b = 7.87 [2.73, 13.02], p < .01,
suggesting that participants who agreed more with the
negative statements (i.e., who believe that the developing
adolescent brain has negative consequences) showed
higher levels of risk-taking behavior. For the positive
statements, all regression models did not predict risk-
taking behavior (see Table 8 for a complete overview).
Effect of Priming on Impulsivity
Before analyzing the effect of priming statements on cog-
nitive impulsivity, we excluded one participant because
of incomplete data, and analyses were performed with
362 participants.
Using a chi-square test for boys (n = 170) and girls
(n= 192) separately, we examined whether priming condi-
tion (positive, negative, and neutral) influenced CRT scores
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics (Min, Max, Mean, and SD) of the BART, Separately for Boys (n = 167) and Girls (n = 188), and the
Total Group (n = 355)
Mean Number of Pumps Points Number of Explosions
Min Max Mean (SD) Min Max Mean (SD) Min Max Mean (SD)
Boys 4.20 110.07 53.80 (18.45) 126 1,561 685.78 (193.82) 0 24 12.75 (4.63)
Girls 2.13 81.10 49.13 (16.68) 64 1,447 687.59 (195.42) 0 22 11.57 (4.21)
Total 2.13 110.07 51.33 (17.66) 64 1,561 686.74 (194.40) 0 24 12.13 (4.44)
Table 8. Linear Model of Priming Effect on Risk-Taking Behavior, Separated by Priming Condition (Negative: n= 119 and Positive:
n = 119), Corrected for Multiple Comparisons (FDR)
Negative Priming Condition Positive Priming Condition
b SE b β p b SE b β p
Model 1
Constant 29.06 7.26 <.001 50.62 9.05 <.001
Mean priming score 7.87 2.59 .27 <.01 1.18 3.18 .03 .71
Model 2
Constant 31.62 7.85 <.001 52.92 9.09 <.001
Mean priming score 7.48 2.64 .26 <.01 1.28 3.15 .04 .69
Sex −2.79 3.24 −.08 .39 −5.16 3.09 −.15 .10
Model 3
Constant 34.09 11.65 <.01 39.15 12.12 <.01
Mean priming score 6.61 4.01 .23 .10 6.21 4.26 .18 .15
Sex −7.02 15.04 −.20 .64 24.78 17.88 .74 .17
Interaction Priming × Sex 1.54 5.34 .12 .77 −10.66 6.27 −.92 .09
For the negative priming condition, R2 = .07 for Model 1, R2 = .08 for Model 2, and R2 = .08 for Model 3; for the positive priming condition,
R2 = .001 for Model 1, R2 = .03 for Model 2, and R2 = .05 for Model 3.
Significant models after FDR correction for multiple comparisons (with an α level = .05) are shown in bold.
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(low, intermediate, and high). No significant differences
between the three statement conditions were found for
girls, χ2(4) = 2.50, p = .65, but for boys, a significant dif-
ference was found, χ2(4) = 10.01, p= .04. However, this
difference disappeared after the FDR correction.
Finally, we conducted a multinomial logistic regression
to analyze whether participants’ agreement with the state-
ments influenced their CRT score, separately for boys and
girls and for participants who received positive and nega-
tive statements. For the negative statements, no differ-
ences were found in CRT scores among boys (n = 56),
χ2(2) = 1.17, p = .56, and girls (n = 64), χ2(2) = 0.58,
p = .75. For the positive statements, no differences were
found in CRT scores among girls (n = 61), χ2(2) = 5.09,
p = .08. However, among boys (n = 59), differences in
CRT scores were found, χ2(2) = 7.59, p = .02. Post hoc
analyses revealed that boys who agreed more with the
positive statements were more likely to have a low CRT
score compared with a high CRT score, OR(95%) =
.01–.81, p = .03. However, this effect did not survive the
FDR correction.
Effect of Priming on Responses to Failure
Descriptive statistics of the response-to-failure task can
be found in Table 9. Seventeen participants had one or
more missing responses for one or both subscales of
the response-to-failure task and were therefore excluded
from the analyses (n = 346). Furthermore, four outliers
were found for HA scores, indicated by z values larger than
2.58 or smaller than −2.58. Therefore, we conducted all
analyses with and without outliers. No differences were
found, and therefore only the analyses including outliers
are reported here.
To analyze whether task performance was influenced by
priming condition, a MANOVA with a 2 (Response-to-failure
subscales: HA and PS) × 3 (Priming condition: positive,
negative, and neutral) model was conducted. Using Pillai’s
trace, no effect of Priming condition on Response to failure
was found, V = .01, F(4, 686) = 1.10, p = .35, observed
power = .35.
Finally, we examined whether responses to the state-
ments (mean agreement scores) influenced the response-
to-failure strategies. We used two separate regression
analyses for participants who received positively framed
statements (n = 117) and for participants who received
negatively framed statements (n = 113). Participants
who received negatively framed statements did not differ
in their responses on both subscales (see Table 10).
However, an effect was found when participants received
positive statements: When participants disagreed more
with the positive statements, the scores of the subscale
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics (Min, Max, Mean, and SD) for the Two Response-to-Failure Subscales, for Boys (n= 165) and Girls
(n = 181) Separately and the Total Group
Helpless Attributions Positive Strategies
Min Max Mean (SD) Min Max Mean (SD)
Boys 1.00 6.00 2.60 (0.95) 1.67 6.00 4.18 (1.10)
Girls 1.00 5.75 2.69 (1.00) 1.00 6.00 4.43 (1.14)
Total 1.00 6.00 2.65 (0.98) 1.00 6.00 4.31 (1.13)
Table 10. Linear Model of Priming Effect on Response to Failure, Divided into Helpless Attributions and Positive Strategies,
Corrected for Multiple Comparisons (FDR)
Helpless Attributions Positive Strategies
b SE b β p b SE b β p
Negative priming condition (n = 113)
Constant 1.95 .38 <.001 4.16 .48 <.001
Mean score 0.20 .13 .14 .13 0.06 .17 .04 .71
Positive priming condition (n = 117)
Constant 1.28 .55 .02 6.03 .60 <.001
Mean score 0.52 .19 .24 <.01 −0.64 .21 −.27 <.01
For the negative priming condition, R2 = .02 for HA and R2 < .01 for PS; for the positive priming condition, R2 = .06 for HA and R2 = .07 for PS.
Significant models after FDR correction for multiple comparisons (with an α level = .05) are shown in bold.
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HA were higher, and when participants agreed more with




Analyses showed that most adolescents rated two of the
three types of behavior as at least partly due to the still
developing brain, as the confidence interval and mean
score were higher than 3.0 within a 1.0–5.0 range: rebel-
lious or disobedient behavior: M = 3.22, SD = 0.81, 95%
CI [3.12, 3.32]; stubborn: M = 3.32, SD = 0.90, 95% CI
[3.21, 3.43]. Most adolescents rated the stereotypical
behavior “eager to learn” as neutral: M = 3.00, SD = 1.07,
95% CI [2.86, 3.13].
Part 2
Independent t tests were conducted to compare the value
ratings between the negative and positive statements.
Table 11. Independent t Tests of the Difference between Positive and Negative Statements
Positive Statements Negative Statements Mpos Mneg t df p 95% CI




1. Due to hormonal changes,
adolescents often have intense
emotions that they find
difficult to properly control.
2.86 2.90 0.29 240 .78 −0.21, 0.28
2. Adolescents are good at
planning and thinking flexibly
because their brain is still
developing.
2. Because their brains are still in
development, many adolescents
struggle to plan their activities.
2.63 3.02 2.67 238 <.01 0.10, 0.68
3. Adolescents are better at
adjusting their behavior within
a group than adults because
they are more sensitive to social
influences.
3. Adolescents are worse at
adjusting their behavior within
a group than adults because
they are more sensitive to social
influences.
2.73 3.41 4.74 234 <.01 0.40, 0.97
4. Adolescents often seek new and
exciting experiences due to the
continued development of the
emotional regions in the brain.
4. Adolescents often display
irresponsible and risky behaviors
because their emotional brain
areas are still developing.
2.31 3.00 5.55 237 <.01 0.44, 0.93
5. Adolescents are good at ignoring
irrelevant information and are
therefore less quickly distracted
than adults.
5. Adolescents are not very good
at ignoring irrelevant
information and are therefore
more easily distracted than adults.
2.77 3.04 1.66 233 <.10 −0.05, 0.59
6. Because adolescents increasingly
gain control over their behavior,
they are more frequently able to
make well-thought-out choices.
6. Because adolescents have less
control over their behavior
than adults, they often make
impulsive choices.
2.28 2.97 5.11 233 <.01 0.43, 0.97
7. During adolescence, connections
in the brain become increasingly
efficient, facilitating more complex
thought processes.
7. During adolescence, connections
and networks in the brain are
not yet efficient, which makes
complex thought processes difficult.
2.45 3.13 5.05 234 <.01 0.41, 0.94
8. Adolescents’ brains are more
flexible than those of adults. As
a result, adolescents are more
able to learn from their
mistakes and adjust their
behavior.
8. Adolescents’ brains are less
flexible than those of adults.
As a result, they are less able to learn
from their mistakes and adjust
their behavior.
2.29 3.31 7.23 232 <.01 0.74, 1.30
9. Your ability to learn can change.
As an adolescent, you can influence
this by doing your best.
9. Adolescents’ ability to learn is
fixed. You have little influence on
this, no matter how hard you try.
2.45 2.82 2.63 232 <.01 0.09, 0.65
Core concepts, overlapping between the positive/negative versions, are displayed in bold.
Significant models after FDR correction for multiple comparisons (with an α level = .05) are shown in italic.
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The independent t tests revealed that most statements were
significantly differently valued between the positive and
negative versions by the participants, with negatively framed
statements being valued more negatively. However, for
Statements 1 (hormonal changes) and 5 (dealing with
irrelevant information), no statistically significant differ-
ence was found ( ps < .78; see Table 11 for an overview).
As no significant differences in value ratings were
found between the positively and negatively framed ver-
sions of Statements 1 and 5, we analyzed the data from
the original study to examine how agreement on the
statements was related to performance on the tasks when
excluding Statements 1 and 5. The analyses examining
the effect of agreement with the statements on risk-
taking behavior (BART scores) showed similar results
with (negative statements: b = 7.87 [2.73, 13.02], p <
.01; positive statements: all regression models, p = ns)
and without Statements 1 and 5 (negative condition:
b = 6.77 [1.95, 11.58], p < .01; positive condition: all
regression models, p = ns).
The analyses examining the effect of agreement with
the statements on impulsivity (CRT scores) showed sim-
ilar results with and without Statements 1 and 5 when
participants received negative statements (no differ-
ences among boys: n = 56, χ2(2) = 2.55, p = .28,
and girls: n = 64, χ2(2) = 1.18, p = .55) as well as when
boys received positive statements (with Statements 1
and 5: n = 59, χ2(2) = 7.59, p = .02; without
Statements 1 and 5: n = 59, χ2(2) = 8.00, p = .02).
However, when girls received positive statements, dif-
ferences in CRT scores were found when excluding
Statements 1 and 5 (n = 61), χ2(2) = 6.52, p = .04,
whereas this effect was not found when Statements 1
and 5 were included in the analyses. Post hoc analyses
revealed that girls were more likely to have a low CRT
score compared with an intermediate CRT score when
they agreed more with the positively framed statements.
However, this effect did not survive FDR correction. So,
considering these corrected statistics, also in this analy-
sis, the results were similar when Statements 1 and 5
were excluded.
Finally, the analyses examining the effect of agreement
with the statements on response to failure also showed
similar results with and without Statements 1 and 5
(see Table 12).
Part 3
Analysis revealed that most participants thought that the
described behaviors used in the priming statements
were more common during adolescence compared with
childhood (M = 2.74, SD = 0.55, 95% CI [2.67, 2.81],
range = 1.00–3.00; see also Figure 3). This indicates that
Table 12. Linear Model of Priming Effect on Response to Failure, Divided into HA and PS, Corrected for Multiple Comparisons
(FDR), with and without Statements 1 and 5
Helpless Attributions Positive Strategies
b SE b β p b SE b β p
With Statements 1 and 5
Negative statements (n = 113)
Constant 1.95 .38 <.001 4.16 .48 <.001
Mean score 0.20 .13 .14 .13 0.06 .17 .04 .71
Positive statements (n = 117)
Constant 1.28 .55 .02 6.03 .60 <.001
Mean score 0.52 .19 .24 <.01 −0.64 .21 −.27 <.01
Without Statements 1 and 5
Negative statements (n = 113)
Constant 1.90 .34 <.001 4.48 .44 <.001
Mean score 0.23 .12 .17 .07 −0.06 .16 −.03 .73
Positive statements (n = 117)
Constant 1.25 .47 <.01 5.87 .51 <.001
Mean score 0.55 .17 .29 .001 −0.60 .19 −.29 <.01
Significant models after FDR correction for multiple comparisons (with an α level = .05) are shown in bold.
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our study findings are specific to adolescence compared
with childhood.
DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to better understand how
neuroscience impacts the real world. By asking both
adolescents and parents about their associations with
the word “teenage brain,” we examined views on this
neuroscience-based topic in the real world. Furthermore,
the effect of priming with positively or negatively framed
statements about adolescent neurocognitive development
on adolescent behavior was examined. The results con-
firmed the idea that undesirable behaviors are more often
mentioned when thinking about the teenage brain and, in
addition, that adolescents were more likely to behave in
line with their ideas about adolescent neurocognitive
development in risk-taking behavior and in their response
to academic failure. We discuss each of these findings
and their implications in more detail below.
Perspectives on the Teenage Brain
Perspectives on the teenage brain were examined through
free associations of both adolescents and parents and by
analyzing adolescents’ agreement toward positively and
negatively framed statements. Associations revealed that,
although parents frequently mentioned the developmen-
tal aspects of the teenage brain (e.g., “growing”), their
associations were dominated by negative conceptions of
the adolescent brain. Interestingly, this was also reflected
in the adolescents’ responses, who expected that adults
(such as their parents or teachers) would report that the
teenage brain causes mostly undesirable behaviors (e.g.,
“irritating”). When asked about their own conceptions, ad-
olescents mentioned negative conceptions more often,
but to a lesser extent than parents. However, their opin-
ions regarding the scientific statements revealed that they
were more likely to agree with statements about positive
compared with negative consequences of adolescent de-
velopment. This suggests that they may also be open to
the positive connotations of continued neurocognitive
development.
Combining these results, we could argue that adoles-
cents themselves think that the teenage brain is something
positive and creates opportunities, whereas parents associ-
ate the teenage brain especially with difficulties and unde-
sirable behaviors. However, parents also view adolescence
as a unique developmental transition characterized by
possibilities, rather than a static and unfortunate devel-
opmental stage. Parents’ perceptions are in line with
the lay message about the teenage brain, which often
emphasizes negative aspects of adolescence and warns
caregivers of the consequences (van de Werff, 2017;
Choudhury et al., 2012). These perceptions may result
from unbalanced (and incorrect) translations of scientific
work, for example, through endorsement of miscon-
ceptions about the brain (van de Werff, 2017; van
Atteveldt et al., 2014; Dekker et al., 2012). The aspects of
adolescence discussed in the scientific literature are more
nuanced and even characterize adolescence as a unique
period with many advantages, such as adapting quickly to
a new environment (Sercombe, 2014; Crone & Dahl,
2012). Despite the more nuanced aspects of adolescent
neurocognitive development, lay people may receive
predominantly negative information through media re-
porting and therefore associate adolescence and the
teenage brain with the occurrence of undesirable behaviors.
Our findings complement previous literature on neuro-
scientific lay messages, in which they elaborated on the
negative aspects of the neurocognitive development of ad-
olescence (van de Werff, 2017; Choudhury et al., 2012), by
differentiating between caregivers and adolescents’ per-
spectives on the teenage brain, including their perceptions
of each other’s perspectives. Interestingly, adolescents
think that adults generally have negative conceptions
about the teenage brain, suggesting that they are also
aware of the more negative lay message as reported in
the popular media. By contrast, although adolescents also
gave predominantly negative associations, their higher
agreement with positive versus negative statements shows
that they are also concerned with the positive conse-
quences of the teenage brain. Previous literature suggests
that expectations of adolescent behavior are predictive of
the later occurrence of this behavior (Buchanan &
Hughes, 2009), suggesting that parents’ expectation of un-
desired behaviors may influence adolescents’ actual
Figure 3. Adolescents’ choice (one of three options) of the developmental
period they thought that the described behaviors in the priming
statements are most common. The different types of behavior as
described in the priming statements are (1) more common during
childhood compared with adolescence, (2) equally common during
childhood and adolescence, or (3) more common during adolescence
compared with childhood.
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behaviors. The contribution of adolescents’ own beliefs
about neuroscience to their behavior is discussed in more
detail below.
Effect of Priming on Risk-taking, Impulsivity, and
Response to Failure
Differences in risk-taking behavior, impulsivity, and re-
sponse to failure in adolescents after priming were exam-
ined by comparing the different priming conditions. First,
the absence of general priming effects on all three of
these typical adolescent behaviors indicated that the
primed perspectives on the teenage brain had no direct
influence on adolescents’ behaviors. Our findings from
the supplemental study suggest that most adolescents
thought of rebellious or disobedient behavior and stub-
born behavior being at least partly the result of the still
developing brain. However, adolescents have a less pro-
nounced opinion that eagerness to learn is the result of
the still developing brain. This may be the result of media
reporting in which brain development is used to explain
stereotypical behaviors during adolescence, emphasizing
more often on negative behaviors such as rebellious and
stubborn behaviors and omitting the effect of brain de-
velopment on more positive behaviors such as eagerness
to learn (van de Werff, 2017). Furthermore, in the supple-
mental study, the positive priming statements were more
positively rated compared with the negative priming
statements, which were more often rated as neutral
(see Table 11). This may suggest that adolescents might
not think that possible negative consequences of adoles-
cence are actually negative. Possibly, they compare the
described behaviors with peers who show that particular
behavior and feel that it is not a negative behavior.
Finally, the supplemental study suggests that the de-
scribed behaviors were specific behaviors during adoles-
cence (vs. childhood; see Figure 3). These findings make
it unlikely that the absence of priming effects may have
been the consequence of the statements not being differ-
ent enough in value (positive vs. negative) or not being
specific enough to adolescence to prime adolescents on
the negative versus positive stereotypes of the teenage
brain. It seems more likely that adolescents’ perspectives
on the teenage brain build up over time and are not influ-
enced by a one-time instance of processing positively or
negatively framed information. This is in line with science
communication research showing that people tend to be-
lieve scientific information in such a way that it fits their
preexisting knowledge or worldview (e.g., O’Connor &
Joffe, 2013). In line with these studies, we did find more
nuanced effects of answering the framed statements on
behavior: (a) Agreeing more with negatively framed state-
ments about the teenage brain predicted more risk-taking
behaviors, and (b) agreeing more with the positively
framed statements predicted the use of more positive
strategies after an academic setback, whereas (c) disagree-
ing more with the positively framed statements predicted
the use of more helpless attributions after an academic
setback. These results corroborate the suggested effect
of already held beliefs about the developing adolescent
brain and suggest that adolescents’ beliefs interact with
reading new information in a reinforcing manner, as agree-
ment with negatively framed statements only predicted
risk-taking behavior, agreement with positively framed
statements only predicted an adaptive response to failure,
and disagreement with positively framed statements only
predicted nonadaptive responses to failure.
In summary, the adolescents’ view of adolescent neuro-
cognitive development affected their behavior in comple-
mentary ways. First, adolescents who agreed more with
negative statements about adolescent brain development
showed increased risk-taking behaviors. This finding is
consistent with earlier findings of Buchanan and Hughes
(2009), who reported that adolescents show more risk-
taking and rebellious behaviors when, 1 year earlier, both
the adolescents and their mothers expected that the ado-
lescents would show these behaviors. This study and other
previous studies suggest that expectations of behavior can
result in biases toward the expected behavior (Qu et al.,
2016; Buchanan & Hughes, 2009). This suggests that both
expectations and actual behavior can be shaped by behav-
iors that are considered normative (Qu et al., 2016).The
findings of our study complement these previous studies
by showing that adolescents’ negative beliefs regarding ad-
olescent brain development lead to increased risk-taking
behaviors in an experimental task instead of self-reported
risk-taking behaviors. However, it has been argued that
risk-taking is not maladaptive in situations where the
benefits of taking the risk outweigh the costs (Ellis et al.,
2012), and therefore more risk-taking behavior is not nec-
essarily a bad thing. Risk-taking can also be beneficial to
adolescents by allowing them to quickly adapt to new
environments, thereby meeting more people and possible
partners and learning about who they are (Sercombe,
2014). It is important that these positive effects of risk-
taking are communicated in media reporting as well to
create more balanced perspectives of the teenage brain.
Second, adolescents who agreed more with positive
statements about adolescent brain development were
more likely to use positive strategies to cope with failure.
In addition, adolescents who disagreed more with the
positive consequences of this development were more
likely to use helpless attributions in response to aca-
demic failure. This finding is consistent with earlier findings
of the impact of beliefs about learning and intelligence on
response to failure (Blackwell et al., 2007). These findings
show that even more general beliefs about the flexible,
sensitive, and changing adolescent brain seem to relate
to more adaptive responding to setbacks.
Surprisingly, adolescents’ agreement with either nega-
tive or positive statements had no effect on adolescents’
cognitive impulsivity. One possibility could be that, as the
adolescents in our study are still attending school, they
are more frequently exposed to the type of questions
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used in the CRT than the previously studied older popu-
lations. This “training” may cause them to be less impul-
sive when faced with the task. However, the scores on the
questionnaire were similar to the scores in the original
article (Frederick, 2005), suggesting that our participants
did not perform differently to older groups. Another pos-
sibility could be that beliefs about the development of the
teenage brain do not influence cognitive impulsive be-
haviors. This would be contrary to previous literature
suggesting that social contexts strongly influence the de-
velopment of decision-making processes, including impul-
sivity (Crone & Dahl, 2012). Therefore, further research is
needed to examine the effect of beliefs about the develop-
ment of the adolescent brain on impulsive behavior in
cognitive contexts during adolescence.
We can conclude that the framing of neuroscientific in-
formation matters, although a one-time instance of expo-
sure to information may not have consequences in and of
itself. Our findings suggest that adolescents’ views of
their developing brain impact their behavior. In addition,
their parents’ perspectives about the teenage brain, such
as “impulsive behavior” or “not able to plan activities,”
may act as self-fulfilling prophecies and influence ado-
lescent behavior (Buchanan & Hughes, 2009). Other
environmental influences such as societal belief in stereo-
types (Qu, Pomerantz, McCormick, & Telzer, 2018) and
cultural differences (Qu et al., 2016) also seem to influ-
ence adolescent behavior. These combined influences
determine how adolescents view themselves, and this as-
sessment seems to be driven in part by their understand-
ing of the developmental (neuro)science research.
Consequently, our findings suggest important implica-
tions for scientists in communicating their study results
guaranteeing beneficial buildup of a realistic, and not
only negative, understanding of the developing adoles-
cent brain. More importantly, it has been shown that
the framing or even misrepresentation of results in ab-
stracts and conclusions in scientific articles is often
adopted in press releases and media reports (Yavchitz
et al., 2012; Gonon, Bezard, & Boraud, 2011) and is also
used to give parenting advice (van de Werff, 2017).
Therefore, scientists need to be proactive in framing their
research findings in a balanced and realistic way and need
to think about how their research will be received by and
impact the real world. An adaptive view of adolescent de-
velopment will create a more realistic belief of neuro-
science in press releases, media reports, and parenting
manuals, and as a result, this adaptive view creates a
better society as a whole (Sercombe, 2014).
Our study has some limitations and possible directions
for future research that should be taken into account.
First, in our coding process, we categorized the associa-
tions adolescents and parents made with the teenage
brain, without consulting how they themselves felt that
their association should be labeled, for example, whether
“lazy” should be labeled as an “undesirable behavior.”
However, because societal norms determine what kind
of behavior is considered desirable and what is not and
because both raters are highly familiar with the Dutch so-
ciety, these categories are likely to represent the relevant
socially constructed behaviors. Still, future studies could
consider to let people categorize their own associations
to validate that the associations are correctly labeled.
Furthermore, it would be interesting to study how often
adolescents demonstrate their mentioned behavior and
use these data to link adolescents’ associations with the
teenage brain to their own behavior. Second, we cannot
be completely sure that the mentioned associations in
our study are all linked to the teenage brain specifically,
because we did not ask our participants whether they
would relate their given associations to neuroscience.
However, findings from our supplemental study suggest
that most adolescents think that the associations are
neuroscience specific. Furthermore, the Dutch word
“puberbrein” is in essence a compound of “showing
puberty-related behavior” and “brain,” and it is therefore
likely that all associations were linked to the teenage
brain as a whole. It is important to note that our results
may not completely generalize to other countries, be-
cause of the specific meaning of “puberbrein.” Third,
we tried to capture the most prevailing stereotypes of
adolescent behavior with our priming statements. How-
ever, stereotypes about adolescents’ sensitivity toward
social stimuli, such as their interpretation of peer-related
social cues (Haller et al., 2017), were not explicitly formu-
lated in our statements. Future studies could consider
including statements in which adolescent stereotypes
toward social stimuli, such as succumbing to peer pressure
or excessive comparison with peers, are used more
explicitly.
Conclusion
Our results of free associations with the term “teenage
brain” show that adolescents and parents’ perspectives
of the teenage brain are in line with the often unbalanced
overviews of scientific research displayed in the media
(van Atteveldt et al., 2014), which often emphasize nega-
tive behaviors (van de Werff, 2017). Interestingly, although
we did not find general effects of priming adolescents with
negatively versus positively framed neuroscientific infor-
mation on their behavior, a more nuanced effect was
found; information that supported adolescents’ ideas
about adolescent brain development reinforced sub-
sequent behaviors. These results show how neuroscience
knowledge affects public discourse and thereby highlights
the importance of incorporating the perspective of parents
and adolescents when determining how to responsibly
move toward dissemination and potential implementation
of neuroscience findings. In addition, communication
about adolescent neurocognitive development should be
framed in a more balanced way to prevent negative public
perceptions of the teenage brain from becoming self-
fulfilling prophesies. So, before we are fully ready for
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real-world neuroscience, we need to be much more aware
of how our neuroscience research impacts the real world.
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Note
1. The “teenage brain” is a compound in Dutch (“puber-
brein”) in which the words “puber,” which is derived from
the verb “puberen” meaning “showing puberty-related be-
havior,” and “brein” are densely intertwined. This word is fre-
quently used and well known among the Dutch population.
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